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At one level, Kim Yuracko tells us, employment discrimination law 
aims to oppose subordination and undermine group hierarchy.1  It 
focuses, accordingly, on which groups merit social protection and which 
do not.2  At a deeper and as yet unexplored level, however, it also 
concerns “a more controversial and covert set of values—one focused on 
promoting certain kinds of individual development, rather than 
undermining group hierarchy, and driven by conceptions of individual 
 * Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, and Affiliated 
Scholar, Institute for Law & Philosophy, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 1. This commentary is a revised version of comments on Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More Complete Theory of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2006).  The earlier 
comments, which focused on Yuracko’s initial draft, were presented as a part of the 
Conference on the Rights and Wrongs of Discrimination held at the University of San 
Diego School of Law, April 28-29, 2006.  This revised commentary develops various 
ideas in my earlier comments but does not reflect any changes Yuracko may have made 
to her article in light of the conference session.  Many thanks to the conference 
participants, especially Michael Blake and David Brink, for helpful discussion of my 
commentary, and to Dana Nelkin for helpful feedback on the penultimate version. 
 2. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 858. 




rather than group worth.”3  Here, “at least at the margins,” she contends, 
antidiscrimination law reflects judicial acceptance of peculiarly perfectionist 
conceptions of human flourishing.4  More specifically, Yuracko argues, 
the case law in certain areas of employment law demonstrates “the dominant 
commitments to intellectual and rational development and valued sexual 
expression of contemporary perfectionist theory.”5  The decisions courts 
reach reveal the efforts of judges to use the tools of antidiscrimination 
law to encourage the development of traits and attributes they consider 
important for a flourishing human life, while discouraging traits they 
consider harmful or insignificant.6
Yuracko’s Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a 
More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law figures as 
one part of her ongoing efforts to shed light on employment discrimination 
law by viewing the decisions of the courts through the lens of perfectionist 
moral and political philosophy.7  Yuracko explores some fascinating 
areas of sex discrimination case law in her article.  She first considers 
cases in which employers hire based on sex either out of consideration 
for their customers’ personal or sexual privacy or with a regard for their 
customers’ preference for a particular kind of sexual stimulation.  She 
then considers cases involving gender nonconformity in the workplace, 
including cases of discrimination against individuals whose physical or 
behavioral traits do not fit sexual stereotypes and against individuals 
whose mere grooming or dress is nonconforming.  In the process of 
examining these sets of cases, Yuracko exposes a genuine puzzle about 
how to make an intelligible and coherent whole out of the sundry 
decisions courts have reached in handling a host of discrimination 
claims. 
I find Yuracko’s inquiry quite intriguing, but I have doubts about the 
central thesis.  My aim, in the discussion that follows, is to press 
Yuracko on two fronts, one methodological, the other substantive.  As 
concerns substance, I shall say a bit as this commentary progresses about 
why Yuracko would need much more support to make good on her claim 
that an implicit perfectionism explains decisional antidiscrimination law.  
My chief interest, however, lies with certain questions as to what 
methodology she means to follow in her efforts to develop a more 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 866. 
 6. Id.  
 7. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 167 (2004). 
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complete theory of employment discrimination law.  Yuracko’s approach is 
one that seems to me to be quite common in legal scholarship, at least in 
legal scholarship with more theoretical ambitions.8  For reasons that I 
shall offer shortly, I find the approach puzzling and problematic.  I want 
to be clear, however, that in pressing methodological questions, my aim 
is not so much to pose a problem for Yuracko, who understandably 
adopts what seems the usual approach of scholars in her field.  Rather, I 
mean to point out how and why, in my view, legal theorists need to pay 
far greater attention to methodology than they generally have.  As for 
Yuracko, I greatly admire her efforts, in this article and elsewhere, to 
tackle complex questions about the theoretical unity and underpinnings 
of employment discrimination law.  For that very reason, I want to urge 
her to adopt an approach better suited to exploring theoretical issues and 
to supporting her most central ideas.9
I.  EXPLANATION AND VINDICATION 
Yuracko’s defense of her thesis turns on an initial distinction between 
liberal and perfectionist ideas, to which we will return.  For purposes of 
pressing the methodological questions, we need to begin by attending to 
how she expresses her claims against the adequacy of appeal to liberal 
ideas and on behalf of perfectionism.  Title VII, she observes, is typically 
viewed as a “paradigmatic liberal antidiscrimination statute.”10  Focusing 
on the two aforementioned contested areas of sex discrimination case 
law, Yuracko observes that Title VII in fact sometimes imposes significant 
 8. It is so common, in fact, that I would not know where to begin citing law 
review articles in order to back up my claim.  Rather than provide an arbitrary list of 
references, I will simply assume that regular readers of law review articles will recognize 
in Yuracko’s article a familiar approach—familiar ways of talking about cases, doctrine, 
and the decisions of courts.  For anyone who is not a regular reader of law review 
articles, I would simply urge them to read a sampling of articles with the words theory or 
theoretical in the title.  With infrequent exceptions, they will see an approach like 
Yuracko’s. 
 9. There may well be a number of viable approaches, and so I do not mean that I 
will suggest one approach in particular. 
 10. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 860.  Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 




accommodationist costs akin to those imposed by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,11 with which Title VII is often contrasted.  Now it is 
worth examining with some care her central claim with regard to the 
case law.  She remarks: 
[T]he antidiscrimination demands imposed on employers in these areas cannot 
be fully understood and explained by resort to Title VII’s core liberal 
commitments; but instead reflect underlying and implicit judicial conceptions of 
human flourishing. . . .  In other words, at least at the margins, the scope of Title 
VII’s antidiscrimination protection is driven by judicial judgments about what 
kinds of people, with what kinds of traits and attributes, are valuable enough to 
be worth the costs of inclusion.12
This passage well represents what seems to me a common approach 
among legal scholars of a more theoretical bent.  It involves vague talk 
about “explaining” cases, judicial decisions, or the law in a given area, 
while invoking the need for one or another moral or justificatory theory 
or theoretical idea to do the requisite explaining.  In so doing, it teeters 
precariously between the causal and the normative, without a sharp 
characterization of the nature of the claims being made.  As I have said, I 
find the approach puzzling and problematic.  Although I focus on 
Yuracko’s article, my concern lies with pointing to difficulties for this 
sort of approach more generally. 
The approach invites a number of questions, but the core one for 
present purposes concerns, as already indicated, precisely how we are to 
understand a claim like Yuracko’s.  As far as I can see, Yuracko never 
explains what she means when she insists that appeal to these conceptions is 
“necessary” to explain and understand the case law.13  There is, after all, 
more than one sort of “explanation” for which such appeal might be 
thought “necessary.”  Appeal to perfectionist conceptions of human 
flourishing might be needed as part of a bare causal explanation, a 
rationalizing explanation, a “vindicative” explanation, or a purely 
normative “explanation.”14
Consider the first possibility and suppose that Yuracko means to say 
that appeal to perfectionist ideas is needed for a bare causal explanation.  
We should then understand her to be claiming that judges are caused, 
perhaps unknowingly, to reach their decisions by unconscious, in her 
words, “implicit” perfectionist conceptions.15  Some of her language 
suggests that she indeed intends something causal.  She talks about a 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
 12. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 862 (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Of course, strictly speaking, a purely normative “explanation” is a justification 
rather than an explanation. 
 15. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 862. 
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perfectionist ideal, for example, as “underlying and driving courts’ 
permissiveness toward discrimination” in privacy cases.16  Now, we 
would naturally want evidence for any such causal claim, and we would 
want to understand how the causation operates.  Why think implicit 
perfectionist ideas drive judges’ decisions, as opposed to any number of 
other “implicit” ideas?  And how precisely do implicit ideas “drive” 
decisions? 
Suppose, however, that Yuracko is right.  That would in one sense, the 
bare causal sense, enable us to explain and understand the case law; we 
would understand the implicit norms causing judges to reach the 
decisions they reach.  We should here note, however, that the appeal to 
perfectionist ideas would be “needed” only due to the contingency that 
certain contemporary judges happen implicitly to accept these ideas, and 
that is not a very strong sense of necessity.  In any event, any causal 
understanding achieved would not necessarily render the case law itself 
more coherent and intelligible; and it would not necessarily show 
judges’ decisions to be either rationally explicable or normatively well-
grounded.  Accordingly, such a causal explanation would, without more, 
provide us with little of real interest from the standpoint of achieving a 
broader theory of employment discrimination law.  To put the point 
differently, it would just invite a question that must be raised and that 
parallels the question about explanation, namely, what sort of theory is a 
theory of employment discrimination law supposed to be?  Causal?  
Rationalizing?  Vindicative?  Normative? 
Perhaps, then, what Yuracko means is that the appeal to implicit 
perfectionist ideas provides us with something akin to a rationalizing 
explanation.  In much the same way that we rationalize (or render 
intelligible) the behavior of a paranoid schizophrenic by appealing to 
what he believes he is hearing, we can rationalize (or render intelligible) 
the decisions of judges, and thereby the case law, by appealing to their 
implicit beliefs about human flourishing.  Rationalizing explanations are, 
of course, partly causal, but they are more than that; they not only 
explain a person’s actions by identifying the causes of his behavior, but, 
in one way, “make sense of” his actions.  Notice, however, that “making 
sense of” is not yet rendering justifiable. 
Yuracko seems, in fact, to think that judges (perhaps unwittingly?) do 
something right when they decide based on implicit perfectionist norms.  
 16. Id. at 870-71 (emphasis added); see also id. at 862. 




So although the text of the article she presented at the USD Conference 
on the Rights and Wrongs of Discrimination did not make this clear, she 
cannot mean to be offering a mere rationalizing explanation.  Indeed, 
during the conference session on her article, she confirmed that she 
seeks a more normatively adequate theory, not merely a more causally 
complete theory or a rationalizing theory.  Still, she might seek a more 
normatively adequate theory along one of two lines. 
The first would retain the core, causal idea expressed in talk about 
explanation.  She would then be engaged in the project of identifying the 
norms that “drive” judicial decisions in the two areas she discusses, 
while attempting thereby to fasten upon a vindicative explanation of 
those decisions.17  A vindicative explanation is, put roughly, an explanation 
that, while uncovering underlying causes or mechanisms, serves, once 
those are grasped, to vindicate what is going on in the domain it explains.  
Identifying the perfectionist ideas about human flourishing that “drive” 
judges’ decisions, for example, would at once causally explain how 
those decisions have come about and vindicate them, at least in some 
measure. 
As I have said, Yuracko does talk as if she has a causal picture in 
mind.  If in seeking a more normatively adequate theory she means to be 
offering a vindicative explanation, then various difficulties would 
remain to be addressed.  In order to support claims about causation, she 
would need to confront the difficult task of developing a story about how 
judges are indeed moved by perfectionist ideas, perhaps unconsciously.  
Any such story would have to allow for and explain causal deviations—in 
this context, outlier or aberrant decisions.  In order to show that causation by 
those ideas is vindicative of the case law, she would need to confront the 
challenge of presenting some argument for why perfectionist ideas are 
correct.  To succeed as a vindicative explanation of the case law, the 
whole picture would have to show judges to be, generally, driven to their 
decisions by their correct, if unconscious, apprehension of true 
perfectionist values.18  Of course, this could not be the whole story 
 17. Peter Railton suggests the idea of a “vindicative explanation” in his exchange 
with David Wiggins concerning the defensibility of naturalistic moral realism, and I 
borrow the basic idea here.  See Peter Railton, What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See 
the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND PROJECTION 
279 (John Haldane & Crispin Wright eds., 1993); David Wiggins, Cognitivism, Naturalism, 
and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND PROJECTION, 
supra, at 301; Peter Railton, Reply to David Wiggins, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND 
PROJECTION, supra, at 315, 323-24. 
 18. For an example of how this basic model has been applied in the context of 
moral theory, see Railton, What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See, the Naturalist Must 
Help Us to Explain, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND PROJECTION, supra note 17; 
Railton, Reply to David Wiggins, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND PROJECTION, supra 
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either.  For we would still need to distinguish between vindicating the 
decisions of judges who are, after all, supposed to be applying the law, 
and vindicating the area of law itself, quite apart from the role of judges 
or of the aims and intentions of the legislature which enacted the law.  
Yuracko would need to say more, then, about precisely what the vindicative 
explanation was vindicating. 
This leads us to a second way to seek a more normatively adequate 
theory of employment discrimination law, one that focuses exclusively 
on normative adequacy.19  Like the first way, the second would seek a 
kind of vindication.  But in adopting a purely normative approach, the 
theorist would dispense with talk suggesting causation in favor of talk 
about what theoretical underpinnings would render the decisions of 
judges normatively coherent and justifiable.20  As in the case of a 
vindicative explanation, this approach would require a defense of the 
particular theoretical underpinnings being invoked.  In taking this 
approach, someone like Yuracko would have to acknowledge that not all 
actual decisions will cohere with those which seem most defensible; not 
all will be justifiable within the favored theoretical framework.  A 
version of this approach, but not the only version, is suggested by 
Ronald Dworkin’s famous jurisprudential theory, which, in its complete 
statement, fully recognizes that in their efforts to fit and justify the 
extant law, judges will have to exclude some bits as mistaken.21  Part of 
the challenge of defending the favored framework would, then, consist 
in offering reasons why we should dismiss the recalcitrant cases. 
I will say a bit more that bears on methodology as these comments 
continue, but the general shape of the worry should now be clear.  Legal 
theorists like Yuracko should not simply talk loosely about explaining 
note 17.  See also Peter Railton, Facts and Values, 14 PHIL. TOPICS 5 (1986); Peter 
Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986); Peter Railton, Naturalism and 
Prescriptivity, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 151 (1989). 
 19. Both Michael Blake and Matt Zwolinski suggested during the conference 
session that perhaps Yuracko means to take such an approach, and in particular, 
Zwolinski suggested she could be taking an approach like Ronald Dworkin’s.  See infra 
note 21 and accompanying text.  I think that Yuracko’s claims more nearly suggest that 
she is offering a vindicative explanation.  But as I try to explain in this commentary, 
whichever normative approach she were to take, she would need both to adopt explicitly 
one approach or another and to confront a good number of difficulties. 
 20. One could, of course, continue to explain some judicial decisions on the 
grounds that particular judges happen to hold the normatively correct view and judge 
accordingly. 
 21. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
ROSATI_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 2/26/2007  1:17:25 PM 
 
934 
and understanding cases or an area of law.  They need to be clearer 
about just what methodology they mean to adopt—that is, about just 
what sort of “explanation” they mean to offer.  Having staked out a clear 
position, they will also need to resolve a host of difficult questions for 
that particular sort of explanation, making the analytical and argumentative 
moves necessary to pull it off.  I will offer some suggestions in closing 
as to how Yuracko herself might proceed.  For now, however, I simply 
stress that, at a minimum, she needs to decide upon and be explicit 
regarding what sort of “explanation” she seeks—what sort of theory she 
has in mind—as she strives to develop a more complete theory of 
employment discrimination law. 
II.  THE STRATEGY OF VINDICATIVE EXPLANATION 
Let me focus at this juncture on the idea of a vindicative explanation 
in order to get at some additional points I wish to make about Yuracko’s 
article.  Doing so seems fair as an expository device given that Yuracko’s 
own language, like that of many other legal theorists, at least suggests 
something both causal and normative. 
A successful vindicative explanation requires, as I have indicated, a 
two-part defense.  One part defends the normative, or vindicative, capacity 
of the explanation.  In the context of Yuracko’s project, in order to 
defend her explanation’s vindicative capacity, Yuracko would have to 
provide a more fully developed account of the conception of human 
flourishing to which judges appeal together with some reason to favor 
that conception.  This, however, seems more a job for a moral philosopher 
than a law professor.  Partly for this reason, I wonder whether either a 
strategy of vindicative explanation or a strategy involving at least some 
kinds of purely normative “explanation” can ordinarily be the right sort 
of project for a legal scholar.  I want to stress ordinarily because some 
legal scholars are also very good moral philosophers, by formal training 
or by self teaching and inclination.  Although I am inclined to endorse a 
rough division of labor, allowing for these and other qualifications, I 
mean less to insist on it than to emphasize that either a vindicative or a 
purely justificatory explanation would need to be undertaken with great 
care.  The legal theorist could proceed, with the requisite caution, in 
more than one way.  Yuracko could, for example, explain perfectionism 
carefully and announce her sympathies for perfectionism, while prescinding 
from its defense and reserving her energies for the second part of the 
defense required for a vindicative explanation. 
That second part is a defense of the proffered vindicative explanation 
as an explanation.  In the context of Yuracko’s project, we would need 
some defense of the seemingly causal claim that it is necessary to appeal 
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to “underlying and implicit” judicial conceptions of human flourishing 
to explain the case law.  The idea that it is necessary to appeal to such 
conceptions is, I take it, the force of the claim that otherwise, these areas 
of discrimination case law “cannot” be fully understood and explained; 
such appeal is necessary, even if it does not afford the entire explanation.  
In order to show that the appeal is necessary, however, we would need 
an argument that clearly identified perfectionist ideas as a cause while 
ruling out alternative explanations; and this, I think, Yuracko has not 
provided.  What is more, because the project is ultimately normative or 
vindicative, the necessity cannot be merely causal; Yuracko would also 
need to show that any alternative would leave the case law unjustified.22
Yuracko commences her project by contrasting liberalism and 
perfectionism.23  I have some worries about the contrast as she depicts it.  
First, the description of liberalism is too sketchy, and it is arguably not 
quite accurate.  Liberalism need not be, and indeed cannot be, value 
neutral toward all competing conceptions of the good, and I doubt that 
any prominent liberal has meant to claim otherwise.24  The term 
liberalism encompasses a diverse array of views and explaining what 
these views have in common requires a good deal of care.  As for 
perfectionism, Yuracko notes the diversity of views among those who 
 22. Dana Nelkin has suggested to me that it might be enough to produce a 
vindicative explanation that the proffered story be one among several that would equally 
satisfy the explanatory and justificatory dimensions.  That seems right to me, though, of 
course, one could no longer claim to have offered the superior account.  See my remarks 
supra pp. 5-6 about overdetermination.  The important point I want to make for present 
purposes just concerns the basic two-part structure of a vindicative explanation and the 
general analytical and argumentative moves that would be needed to make good on it. 
 23. See Yuracko, supra note 1, at 862-66. 
 24. Yuracko seems to endorse or share Michael Sandel’s depiction of (Rawlsian) 
liberalism.  Compare id. at 862-63, with MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT 4 (1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 116-
17 (1982).  For Rawls’s presentation of his own views, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 173-74 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 399-406 (1971).  But I 
think that Sandel misconstrues Rawls on key points.  In Democracy’s Discontent, for 
example, Sandel’s critique arguably mischaracterizes liberalism, and Rawlsian liberalism, 
on a number of counts: it construes too narrowly what liberals see as at stake when they 
advance a conception of public reason; it misconstrues what the ideal of public reason 
asks of us; it relies on a notion of reasonableness that liberals sensibly reject in the 
political context; and, most important for present purposes, it misconceives the liberal 
aim of neutrality.  For some critical discussion of Sandel’s critique of liberalism, see, for 
example, Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 
308 (1985). 




might be classified as perfectionists.25  But her discussion here and 
elsewhere seems to conflate a number of distinct normative notions: the 
notions of human perfection, of human flourishing, and of what gives 
meaning in a life.  Although some perfectionists no doubt want to tie 
these notions together, they are conceptually distinct.  Those who reject 
perfectionism may have their own conceptions of human flourishing, and 
it is an open question whether what makes for a flourishing human life 
also makes for a meaningful human life.26  Finally, I think Yuracko’s 
discussion treats liberalism and perfectionism as if they are in opposition 
when they need not be.  Liberalism is not a class of theories about how 
we ought to live but about the relationship of government or society to 
citizens.  Perfectionism is, at least in the first instance, a class of theories 
about how to live, not about the relationship of government or society to 
citizens.  One can, of course, be a perfectionist in one’s political 
philosophy—one can think it is the government’s business to make us 
more perfect humans, through support where possible or coercion where 
necessary; but one need not be a perfectionist in both one’s moral and 
political philosophy.  Most important for present purposes, one can take 
the liberal view that, to put it too crudely, the government and the basic 
structure of society must be largely neutral with regard to competing 
conceptions of the good while nevertheless holding that individuals, to 
lead flourishing lives, ought to follow perfectionist norms.27
Accepting for purposes of argument the distinction Yuracko draws, 
must we appeal to judges’ underlying perfectionist ideas to explain and 
justify the case law in the two areas Yuracko discusses?  I am not yet 
convinced.  Consider her discussion of the courts’ privacy decisions.  She 
contends that “doctrine does not well explain courts’ privacy decisions” but 
 25. See Yuracko, supra note 1, at 863-66. 
 26. Let me expand just a bit.  The notions of human perfection and of what makes 
for a good or flourishing life differ, even if important overlap exists between leading 
lives that are good for us and developing and exercising, or “perfecting,” our capacities.  
After all, a life spent developing one’s capacities could make some individuals 
miserable.  The notions of human perfection and of a meaningful life also differ, even if 
some meaningful lives involve perfecting oneself.  Consider the fact that certain 
paradigmatically meaningful lives, such as the life of Mother Theresa, displayed marked 
self-sacrifice.  Finally, the notions of what is good for a person and what makes her life a 
meaningful one differ, even if some overlap exists between what makes an individual’s 
life go well and what makes her life meaningful.  We understand very well what 
distressed Tolstoy when he felt that, despite his contented home life and his success as a 
writer, his life was meaningless.  See LEO TOLSTOY, My Confession, in THE MEANING OF 
LIFE (E.D. Klemke, ed.). 
 27. Notice, however, that even when one stops short of adopting perfectionism, 
one can, as Rawls does, recognize that certain “primary goods” will be needed whatever 
one’s conception of the good, and hold that the principles that govern the basic structure 
of society should be chosen in a way that reflects this fact.  See RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 24 at 62, 92-95. 
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“perfectionism does.”28  Here we see a certain slippage that occurs in the 
article between claims about the explanatory inadequacy of doctrine and 
about the explanatory inadequacy of liberalism or liberal values.29  Legal 
doctrine may not be a perfect reflection of liberal theory, and so the 
decisions courts reach might not be explainable in terms of doctrine, 
while being well explained by liberalism. 
Yuracko discusses two principal cases in this context.  In one of them, 
Local 567, American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees 
v. Michigan Council 25,30 the district court held that the role of workers 
in providing patients with needed personal hygiene care could justify the 
state mental health care institution’s practice of sex-based hiring.  
Yuracko emphasizes the court’s explanation that it “cannot conceive of a 
more basic subject of privacy than the naked body,” and that the desire 
to shield one’s naked body from the view of (opposite sex) strangers “‘is 
impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.’”31  In the 
second case, Michenfelder v. Sumner,32 involving a prison facility that 
conducted strip searches, the Ninth Circuit found no constitutional 
violation because female officers were not routinely present for the strip 
searches of male prisoners, and visitors could not view the searches.  
Yuracko stresses the court’s remarks that “prisoners retain a limited right 
to bodily privacy,” a right connected to individuals’ “self-respect and 
personal dignity.”33  Summing up, Yuracko says, “[f]or these courts, customer 
preferences to shield their bodies and sexuality from exposure are simply 
different and more valuable than other types of customer preferences, in 
particular those for commodified sexuality.”34
Yuracko has an important insight here: courts may indeed recognize 
the greater importance of certain customer concerns, and rightly so.  But 
Yuracko goes a step further, taking the courts’ decisions to reveal an 
underlying perfectionist ideal.  Of course, she may be right even in this 
stronger claim about what judges really (on some level) believe or 
presuppose; but she has not offered the arguments needed to support it, 
and the courts’ decisions do not, on their face, support her conclusion.  
 28. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 869. 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 869-70. 
 30. 635 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
 31. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 870 (citing Local 567, 635 F. Supp. at 1013). 
 32. 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 33. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 870 (quoting Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333). 
 34. Id. at 870-71. 




In fact, the explicit appeal to a right of bodily privacy is arguably a 
quintessentially liberal appeal. 
Yuracko offers no more in the way of argument for her claim that 
whereas the courts’ implicit perfectionism is revealed in their permissiveness 
toward discrimination in the privacy cases, it is revealed by their 
impermissiveness toward discrimination when it comes to what she calls 
“plus-sex” businesses.35  She maintains that we would be hard pressed 
to argue that the courts’ prohibition of sex discrimination in cases 
involving plus-sex businesses, such as the famous Wilson v. Southwest 
Airlines Co.36 case and Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Division 
of Human Rights,37 is required by either formal conceptions of sex-blind 
equality or a “standard antisubordination principle.”38  On the contrary, 
she claims that such hiring “seems to fall squarely within Title VII’s 
BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] exception.”39  In order to 
reach the courts’ position, judges must, she tells us, first redefine the 
nature of the business.  Yuracko contends that perfectionism is “driving” 
the “initial redefinition” and is required to explain the courts’ prohibition 
on sexual titillation in mainstream jobs.40
Yuracko may be right about the limitations of formal principles.  
Again, though, as far as I can see, Yuracko provides no argument for her 
claims, and she too quickly concludes that a formal conception of sex-
blind equality could not explain the courts’ decisions.  I would have 
liked to see her explore the explanatory powers of the idea of sex-blind 
equality in far more depth before moving to her perfectionist alternative. 
Although she does not really argue for her claims, Yuracko does tell 
us something about why she thinks that the substantive ideas of 
perfectionism, unlike the formal conceptions of antidiscrimination legal 
 35. See id. at 871 (defining this term). 
 36. 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see Yuracko, supra note 1, at 872-73. 
 37. 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); see Yuracko, supra note 1, at 872 
n.55. 
 38. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874. 
 39. Id.  The statute creating the BFOQ exception states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, 
for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, 
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on 
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
 40. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874. 
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doctrine, can explain the cases involving plus-sex businesses.  Elaborating 
on her claim that courts must first redefine the nature of the business 
before they can conclude that employment practices fall outside of the 
BFOQ exception, she remarks: “Such redefinition reveals . . . both a 
sense of the importance of promoting individuals’ intellectual and cognitive 
development and a sense of the danger that explicit sexualization poses 
to such development.”41  Yuracko has an important insight—if not about 
what actually causes judges to decide as they do, then about what might 
justify those decisions—when she emphasizes the importance of intellectual 
and rational development and notes the problem overt sexualization may 
pose.  How this gets us to the idea that perfectionism is required to explain 
the courts’ decisions, however, remains unclear.  Consider this alternative: 
the courts’ reasoning reveals a sense of the importance of protecting 
women’s equal rights to make career choices, pursue careers on equal 
terms, and develop as they see fit, as well as a sense of the danger 
explicit sexualization poses to women’s equality.  It would have been 
helpful for Yuracko to say more about why she thinks the case law 
favors her position over an explanation like this. 
But what, Yuracko might ask, should we make of the fact, for example, 
that the courts decline to support discrimination where customer preferences 
are for commodified sexuality?  What causes them to treat the latter cases 
differently from cases of sexual or personal privacy is one thing, what 
would justify that different treatment is another.  Though it would 
require more theoretical work than I can undertake here, a relatively 
straightforward answer from the liberal perspective seems available.  
After all, not all preferences are for things to which one has a moral 
right.  So we can likely say something along the following lines from the 
standpoint of liberal theory, if not legal doctrine: An employer can 
defend a discriminatory hiring practice as a BFOQ where that discriminatory 
practice is reasonably necessary to support a basic right.  To be sure, like 
any right, the right to bodily privacy has to be grounded in something—
in this case, an individual’s legitimate interest (which is no mere 
preference) in preserving a sense of privacy, personal dignity, and self-
respect.  Again, though, there is nothing peculiarly perfectionist in these 
ideas. 
Later Yuracko argues that, as in the BFOQ cases, certain sexual 
harassment cases reveal a judicial concern with ensuring not only that 
 41. Id. at 878. 




women have access to jobs but that they have access to the sorts of jobs 
that promote valuable human development.42  This valuable development 
involves, in particular, the cultivation of rational and intellectual capacities, 
rather than sexual ones.43  She elaborates: 
In other words, courts’ neat division of the work world into sex and nonsex jobs 
and their unwillingness to allow employers to sexualize mainstream jobs, seems 
driven, at least in part, by an implicit perfectionism that seeks to promote and 
protect women’s ability to develop as intellectual and rational actors by carving 
out a space for them in the work world where they cannot be formally and 
explicitly sexualized.44
These remarks follow a discussion of two cases involving, respectively, a 
cocktail waitress and a lobby hostess.45  Having worked for several years 
as a waitress, I can confirm that it is often grueling work; I can also 
confirm that nothing about it particularly encourages women’s ability to 
develop as intellectual and rational actors.  Unless Yuracko means 
something extraordinarily weak by “intellectual and rational development,” 
these seem odd cases to support her point.  Even if the employment at 
issue in these cases can aid intellectual and rational development, coping 
with adverse working conditions of the sort these women confronted 
arguably can also aid such development, and sometimes even more so.  
Of course, I have no doubt that on balance, smooth working conditions 
better allow for all sorts of development than do adverse working 
conditions.  Adverse working conditions may be most worrisome, however, 
not because they preclude women’s development, but because they 
impose special burdens on women’s development and, moreover, alter 
the process of development so that it may not take place as women 
would choose.  These considerations point us to an alternative explanation 
of the case law: the courts are concerned to protect women’s ability to 
exercise their equal rights to develop as they see fit.  Again, nothing 
peculiarly perfectionist need be involved in such an idea. 
Yuracko briefly discusses some empirical studies which may bear out 
what she takes to be the courts’ perfectionist concerns, suggesting that 
judges may “indeed be right in viewing the explicit sexualization of the 
workplace as potentially dangerous to other more valuable forms of 
individual development.”46  It is unclear how reliable or telling these 
studies actually are, but what matters for present purposes is that they 
equally support an alternative explanation of the case law.  The danger 
 42. Id. at 879-80. 
 43. Id. at 880. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 878-80 (discussing Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986), 
and EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 46. Id. at 883. 
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the courts are concerned to ward off could as well be described as a 
danger to full and fair exercise of equal rights; and the studies Yuracko 
summarizes equally bear out that concern.  Let me stress that as a 
normative matter, I think Yuracko has an important insight when she 
emphasizes both the importance of preserving a realm for individual 
development and the dangers that sexualization of the workplace creates 
for women’s development in particular.  I merely question her claims 
that perfectionism is necessary to explain judicial decisions, either as 
(implicit) cause or as justification. 
Turning to the second area of the case law, Yuracko tells us that the 
courts’ judgments in cases concerning gender nonconformity also reveal 
underlying perfectionist ideals.  At the same time, they appear more 
fractured and inconsistent, reflecting “disagreement about the value of 
different conceptions and expressions of gender and personal identity.”47  
Yuracko acknowledges that some of the courts’ decisions may be 
justified by antisubordination concerns and formal sex-blind equality, 
yet she insists that neither traditional doctrine can explain adequately the 
ways in which courts limit antidiscrimination protection: “Ultimately, 
courts’ distinction between protected and unprotected forms of gender 
bending reflects changing and unsettled judicial judgments about the 
relative worth of different forms of gender identity expression.”48
Yuracko notes that subsequent courts, in extending the holding of 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins49 to protect effeminate men, have substituted 
for the Price Waterhouse antisubordination rationale a formal status-
blind trait equality rationale.50  The latter, she claims, does not make 
conceptual sense and is difficult to reconcile with the courts’ actual 
decisionmaking.  Yuracko may be right, but it is unclear how her 
discussion supports her claim that it makes no conceptual sense.  Even if 
it is true that traits and actions are viewed, as she puts it, “through a 
systematically gendered lens,” it does not follow that men and women 
can never engage in precisely the same behavior or even that it is not 
clear whether they can.  Indeed, the studies she invokes to support the 
“gendered lens” idea rely on having male and female candidates perform 
 47. Id. at 883. 
 48. Id. at 885. 
 49. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (holding that treating a female employee differently 
for failing to behave in a manner deemed sufficiently feminine constituted sex 
discrimination). 
 50. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 888. 




or act in the same way—for example, by making the same suggestions 
and arguments.51  Were we to accept the claim that men and women can 
never engage in precisely the same behavior, and were we even seriously 
to doubt whether they can, we would have trouble making sense of the 
common idea that shifts can occur, and have occurred, in social attitudes 
toward behavior by men and women; any shift in attitude would have to 
signal a change of behavior. 
Yuracko allows that an analytical basis for the courts’ prohibition on 
sex stereotyping might be found in a “thick conception of sex blindness” 
which tells employers that they must ignore not only sex but all the ways 
that gender norms affect how people view various behaviors.52  But such 
a thick conception, she contends, “does not” (cannot?) explain the courts’ 
actual decisions.  Otherwise, the courts would have to extend it to men 
wearing high heels and lipstick or to those who otherwise violate sex-
specific manners of dress and grooming.  They have not, however, and she 
claims that this suggests that “more complicated—and contested—value 
judgments about worthwhile and worthless expressions of gender identity 
are also playing a role in the decisions.  In other words, what appears on 
the surface to be a liberal antidiscrimination principle may in fact be 
perfectionism in drag.”53  Perhaps, but not necessarily.  Judges may simply 
be biased, uncomfortable, or disinclined to override traditional ideas 
without a firmer doctrinal mooring.  They may think that one’s rights or 
equal opportunity are only violated when one cannot conform or one is 
being forced to conform in a larger context of discrimination. 
The upshot of the foregoing substantive line of challenge is this: it 
seems that any judicial decision that apparently evidences a perfectionist 
value judgment can be redescribed, without strain, as evidencing a 
concern to protect the (equal) exercise of a right.  My claim is not that 
the courts’ decisions are instead “driven” by liberal ideas.  Rather, it is 
that the courts’ decisions do not appear to support the claim that judges 
implicitly accept and are driven by perfectionism.  What judges say and 
do is arguably consistent with a number of larger theoretical pictures, 
liberalism among them. 
I do not mean to suggest that what courts say and do can never 
preclude certain theoretical underpinnings; I simply want to stress two 
points.  First, at a normative level, far more overlap exists between what 
competing theories prescribe than may be obvious just from looking at 
the terms of the theories.  Second, judges are not moral or political 
philosophers, and so their decisions will largely underdetermine what we 
 51. Id. at 889. 
 52. Id. at 891. 
 53. Id. at 893. 
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should say at a more theoretical level.  Both of these considerations 
suggest that legal scholars need to exercise caution when they invoke or 
rely on normative theory.  Of course, it is always open to a legal scholar 
to argue that we ought to accept, for example, perfectionism at a 
theoretical level—that the virtues of perfectionism as compared with 
rival normative theories make it the better framework within which to 
view judicial decisions.  But as I have already indicated, I think that, 
with various qualifications, we ordinarily have some reason to preserve a 
division of labor with respect to the elaboration and defense of broad 
normative theories; and not just because the latter enterprise is more the 
philosopher’s bailiwick.  Rather, an argumentative strategy of the sort 
just described may divert energy from developing and defending what 
will often be a legal scholar’s most important doctrinal and normative 
ideas.  It may also fairly invite theoretical attacks irrelevant to what is of 
real interest from the standpoint of our understanding and assessment of 
the law.  Unless they are careful to spare the theory, legal scholars may 
spoil the insight. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I want to end with a general suggestion, namely that Yuracko may be 
able to make certain key points without all of the theoretical overlay, 
which I confess strikes me as idle.  Adverting to an earlier observation—
that even if judicial decisions cannot be explained in terms of doctrine, 
they might be explicable in terms of liberalism—I would encourage 
Professor Yuracko to decide on her real target, think about her true aims, 
and adapt her strategy accordingly.  I have spent a good bit of time 
treating her article as offering a vindicative explanation because it seems 
to me that this comes closest to reflecting her discussion.  I would 
encourage her, however, to distance herself from the causal claims that 
seem to attract her; these strike me as problematic.  Having done so, she 
might pursue one or both of the following two projects—and, no doubt, 
some others besides—each of which seems to capture some of her core 
ideas and concerns. 
Yuracko might undertake a project of conceptual analysis, attempting 
to show that the traditional doctrinal ideas of status blindness and 
antisubordination, as a conceptual matter, cannot encompass all that the 
courts have said and done.  In doing so, she would need to map out very 
clearly the conceptual contours of the doctrine and then explain why, in 
order to reach the courts’ decisions in the cases she considers, something 
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more would be required analytically.  For this, she would need to offer a 
convincing defense of what that something more is and of how it fills the 
analytical gaps.  As a second possibility, she might undertake a purely 
normative project, arguing that the courts’ decisions are best justified by 
appealing to certain core values, such as the value of individual development, 
including development of intellectual and rational capacities.  In doing 
so, she would need to allow that these core values might, at a deeper 
level, be encompassed by any number of larger normative theories.  Of 
course, the latter normative project would amount to abandoning what 
appear to be Yuracko’s present theoretical ambitions.  It would, however, 
have her employing her important insights in a way arguably better 
suited to both the normative and practical character of law. 
 
